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Abstract
It is widely recognised that there is a considerable gap in the protection of the national infrastructure. Trying to
identify what is in fact ‘critical’ is proving to be very difficult as threats constantly evolve. An interactive
prototyping tool is useful in playing out scenarios and simulating the effect of change, however existing
simulators in the critical infrastructure area are typically limited in the visual representation and interactivity.
To remedy this we propose the use of games technology. Through its use, critical infrastructure scenarios can be
rapidly constructed, tested, and refined. In this paper, we highlight the features of games technology and
associated tools to creating immersive simulations of critical infrastructure and present our implementation.
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INTRODUCTION
Modern society relies upon various networks of infrastructure. Critical infrastructure are assets that when
disrupted cause a large scale impact on society and the economy. Such infrastructure includes agriculture, water,
energy, communications, transport, health, government, and defence. Each infrastructure network is complex,
and each network is often interrelated (Rinaldi, 2001). A disruption in one network can propagate into others
causing a set of interdependent failures. For example, a gas pipeline explosion that occurred in Western
Australia on the 3rd June 2008, reduced the states gas supply by 35% (Gosch, 2008). The effect of this loss
propagated through to affect the transport, building, hospitality, health, and mining industries leading to a total
estimated economic loss to the state of AU$6.7 billion (Sydney Morning Herald, 2008).
There are several reasons why critical infrastructure can fail. In the example above, the rupture of a pipeline was
a technical failure. The risk of such technical failures can be determined through standard risk engineering,
where risk is measured as the probability of failure multiplied by the severity of the consequences. Such risks
can be mitigated by analysing the probability of failure and building in safety margins, redundancies, and
maintenance processes to lower the risk to an acceptable level.
Another cause for failure is deliberate interference and sabotage. Although a classical probabilistic-based risk
approach is at times used to determine an appropriate level of protection, its validity is questioned. Manunta
(2002) identifies potential shortcomings that challenge some of the assumptions behind the use of classical risk
based approaches. If a security specialist uses the probability of an attack to identify areas to defend, an attacker
can utilise the same probabilities to identify areas that will not be defended. Such threats are not static and can
evolve when they encounter counter-measures.
Many organisations perform security risk assessments only once a year, although since September 2001, some
organisations undertake reviews on a more frequent basis (Gibson, 2003). Manunta (2002) questions the
relevance of such ad hock reviews of risk, because by the time the results arrive, they tend to be outdated. The
context will dictate the how quickly such results become invalid. But in the current security climate, the terrorist
threat is dynamic, evolutionary, and able to adapt and learn.
If elements in the risk analysis are seen to be at fault, so too is the method by which the risk assessment has been
carried out. In the majority of the cases, those that have been conducting the risk analysis have not always been
the required experts in their field who can truly identify what is deemed ‘critical’. Due to the interdependent
nature of critical infrastructure, this often requires a number of multiple experts to be involved in the process,
which is often problematic. If their expertise could be harnessed in a way that allows security mangers to
understand the complexities of the infrastructure involved, then it may be possible to develop improved risk
assessments.
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SIMULATION FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Our proposed solution to the problems outlined above is an interactive, high fidelity simulation tool built by
adapting existing games technology. Simulation tools help bridge the gap in understanding between experts
from different disciplines by determining the effect of changes to the system whilst hiding its complexity
(Talend, 2008). This makes each expert area accessible to the whole team. Furthermore, the online nature of
modern computer games gives greater opportunities for remote experts to perform security reviews and
exercises.
Several tools exist for the simulation of critical infrastructure. Pederson et al. (2006) identified 30 simulation
systems in a survey of research into critical infrastructure interdependency modelling. These simulations range
in maturity from research to commercial systems and model a variety of infrastructure using various simulation
types.
Most existing critical infrastructure simulations provide a simple single-user graphical visualization of the
infrastructures and their interdependencies. This typically consists of a graph display, with infrastructure nodes
connected by edges to show interdependencies. Some simulations are integrated with a Geographic Information
Systems (GIS) application and the graph is overlaid over a top-down 2D map of the area. Such displays are
useful for traditional risk-based analysis in the design and analysis of critical infrastructure systems, but not for
identifying local security vulnerabilities.

THE ROLE OF GAMES TECHNOLOGY
Coupling a critical infrastructure simulator to a 3D environment provides several possibilities for security
analysis. For example, accurate views from existing and proposed security cameras can be analysed, as can
views from locations where infrastructure could be observed by an attacker. These visibility studies can be
performed under various simulated environmental conditions, as demonstrated in Figure 1. Adding a 3D
positional sound system would allow the evaluation of audible systems, such as the effectiveness of alarm
networks in an emergency.
A simulator that lets users take the roles of a person on the ground allows for the enactment of realistic
scenarios, allowing response times and behaviour patterns to be determined. Finally, the inclusion of artificial
intelligence (AI) controlled characters in the simulator allows for the simulation of human activities. This is
useful for automatic testing of the infrastructure and simulating the behaviour of large crowds. A major benefit
of simulating the infrastructure is that security tests can be applied before infrastructure is build, allowing for
lower cost design alterations to minimise vulnerabilities.

Figure 1: Simulating different environmental conditions.

By leveraging games technology there is the ability to present the ‘intruder’ into the visual concept thus
allowing for a greater assessment of the potential capability of actually inflicting damage. Many times this is a
perceived threat that is not borne out by the reality of the known situation. Moreover, once a target has been
identified there is the added ability to develop variations of target hardening, which can be tested prior to
implementation. This has substantial cost benefits as it is not necessary to actually build in the suggested
changes, in order to test them against the ‘intruder’. An example scenario of an adversary seeking to sabotage
the power infrastructure is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Introducing adversaries into the simulation allows for interactive testing and refinement of countermeasures.

GAME ENGINE TECHNOLOGY REVIEW
We now give an overview of the tools and technology used to create modern games to demonstrate their
applicability in creating virtual worlds for infrastructure modelling and simulation. The majority of computer
games are not created ‘from scratch’, but rather use and extend on existing components. The sum of these
components that are used to create a game is called a game engine. Game engine functionality includes
computer code that implements features such as audio, graphics, network, physics, and AI components. In
addition, most game engines provide visual interactive tools for using these systems and populating them with
the actual content. For example, the game engine includes the code that will draw objects in 3D perspective with
various effects such as lighting and fog, whilst the tools are used to construct the actual objects that will be
drawn.
In creating an immersive environment for critical infrastructure simulation there are many game engines to
choose from. DevMaster.net is a database of game engines, listing features and including user reviews
(DevMaster.net), at time of writing containing information on 287 game engines. Some engines are free using
various open source licences, whilst others may cost hundreds of thousands of dollars to licence. Engine quality,
ease of use and fidelity of the environment produced also vary with game engines.
The cost of the technology license is only one factor to consider. The other major factors are support costs,
which hinge on the quality of the tools provided with the game engine. This includes the quality of the world
editor, script development environment, and the tools that are used to import the 3D models from their various
formats to the one the game engine understands.
Finally, a major influence on the cost of developing a simulator is the level of support that is available from the
vendor. Open source and independent games often have less support from the developers than professional
offerings, however they often have a large community that is willing to provide support. Additionally, these
platforms often contain books, websites, or research publications that can greatly assist developers, unlike other
more traditional offerings.
Audio
Game engines typically support background audio, used to play music and menu sounds, along with 3D
positional sound. Positional sound is emitted from a specific location in the world. Its perceived loudness is
affected by distance, velocity, and occlusion by objects in the world. In an immersive critical infrastructure
simulation, positional sound can be used to answer questions related to audibility of sound emitted by intruders,
alarms, and the infrastructure itself. The simulation can be used to test different alarm locations, placement of
barriers that can only be breached by making noise, and designing the layout to place personnel in locations
where sound from malfunctioning infrastructure can be detected.
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Graphics
The component of the game engine responsible for displaying the content to the screen is the graphics engine.
The main functionality of the graphics engine is processing and displaying of 3D information in the world. This
includes displaying and animating 3D computer controlled characters, lighting effects (e.g.: day and night), 3D
representations of buildings, foliage, and all other content. The graphics engine also has the ability to display 2D
information overlayed over the 3D view. An example of this is the graphical user interface that allows the user
to press buttons and receive information from the simulator, as shown in Figure 3. The graphics is the primary
means for providing information to the user of a critical infrastructure simulation, and is crucial for the
simulation of visually based devices, such as security cameras. The graphical display can be used to provide
information regarding the location of intruders, points of failure, the area monitored by security systems, etc.

Figure 3: A Game Engine typically provides support to view graphics with 3D perspective and also 2D graphics for menus.

The 3D world can be viewed from several cameras, representing the view of different persons or actual cameras
in the world. The top down view, much like the one in traditional ‘big-picture’ simulators can also be gained by
positioning a camera above the scene looking down, as shown in Figure 4. This kind of view can be used to gain
a general overview of the scenario, and is also useful in a de-briefing situation offering a convenient perspective
for re-playing a scenario that had been run previously.

Figure 4: A ‘Big-Picture’ overview can be obtained using an overhead camera. This can be used by those acting in an
observer role, or for re-playing missions as part of a de-briefing.

Network
In a computer game, playing against human opponents over a network provides extra challenge. Most 3D game
engines offer networking components to facilitate this. In an immersive simulation, network communication
allows geographically dispersed teams to evaluate scenarios. When interdisciplinary teams are concerned, as in
the case of critical infrastructure simulation, the expertise required to analyse infrastructure interdependencies
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and determine vulnerabilities may be dispersed across continents. Providing a networked simulator allows the
selection of team members based on expertise, rather than geographic proximity.
Physics
A physics engine is responsible for calculating how objects move and interact within the environment. The
physics engine detects collisions between interacting objects, calculates the response forces, and computing the
updated locations of the simulation objects. This allows the simulation of objects falling over (such as trees
falling onto power lines, or across roads) and the effects of an attack on critical infrastructure (such as a vehicle
crashing into a complex). This greatly increases the fidelity of the simulation. The physics engine can also be
used to update the audio subsystem in a physically realistic manner, such as providing different sounds based on
the contents on a container. This information can be used to educate security personal about how something
should sound.
Artificial Intelligence
The artificial intelligence system contains functionality for automatically generating the behaviour of intelligent
entities within the game. This functionality typically depends on the type of application the game engine targets,
such as a first-person shooter or a real time strategy game. Common components of an AI system are path
finding, behaviour based systems, and planning. Path finding enables a computer controlled character to
navigate from one location to another. This allows the simulation of an intruder in a given scenario and allows
the situation to be replayed and respond to modification of the environment (e.g. creating obstacles such as
fences).
The behaviour subsystem of an AI engine allows different behaviours to be assigned to a character. Typical
examples are adding an avoidance behaviour for one character, and a chase or attacking behaviour for another.
This technology can be used to simulate large crowds of people, allowing the evaluation of evacuation plans or
crowd dispersal during a terrorist attack, as illustrated in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Computer controlled characters can be created using an AI engine.

Scripting
Each game has unique differences in mechanics and gameplay. In order to realize these using a generic game
engine requires the setup of the game logic, or game rules. This is a programming task, however the size and
complexity of the game engine program code makes it challenging to modify this code directly. To speed up
development, and minimize the introduction of errors into the engine code, engines typically offer a simplified
programming interface to the engine using a scripting language. Available scripting languages range from
functional and object-oriented languages to flow-chart based graphical tools. An example for the Torque Game
Engine Advanced is given in Figure 6, showing the script editor Torsion.
The logic for critical infrastructure simulations includes encoding their interdependencies and models for
production, transportation, and storage. These can be implemented in script using suitable data structures and
algorithms. Scripting languages offer an interface to the other modules of the game engine, and thus can be used
to customise these. For example, custom artificial intelligence entities, such as for security patrols and intruders
can be defined with specific behaviours and physical parameters.
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Figure 6: Aspects of the simulation can be customised using a scripting language. Torsion is an integrated development
environment (IDE) for the Torque game engine, providing modern features such as syntax highlighting, word completion,
and the ability to step through script code and view contents of variables.

Game Engine Tools
The difference between engines costing hundreds of thousands of dollars, and ones offered for free is often not
so much in the graphics and realism possible, but in the quality of the supporting toolsets. This includes the
quality of the world editor, script development environment, and the utilities that are used to import the 3D
models from their various formats to the one the game engine understands.
The useability of the world editor is integral to the viability of a game engine. Through the world editor the user
can construct and modify the environment. For example, a user may test placing lights at different positions to
see how it affects the visible area. Alternatively the world editor can be used to interact with intelligent agents.
If an “intruder” agent is attempting to enter a premises the user can experiment with different environmental
configurations, such as placing additional fences around the building. A world editor will let the user perform
the desired operations efficiently has the potential to significantly cut the development time for scenarios. The
world editor for the Torque Game Engine Advanced is shown in Figure 7. This world editor is integrated into
the game engine allowing interactive editing of the scenario whilst the simulation is running.

Figure 7: A world editor allows the developer to graphically position objects in the world and modify their parameters.
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Whilst the world editor allows for modification of the 3D world, the Graphics User Interface (GUI) editor
allows for the creation of the 2D menu components. The GUI editor from the Torque Game Engine Advanced is
shown in Figure 8, allowing various elements such as buttons and labels to be placed over the 3D scene.

Figure 8: The GUI editor in the Torque Game Engine Advanced allows 2D menus and displays to be overlayed on the 3D
visuals of the world.

IMMERSIVE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SIMULATOR
Our work-in-progress, the Immersive Critical Infrastructure Simulator (ICIS), has been undergoing development
from 2007 using the Torque Game Engine and Torque Game Engine Advanced from Garage Games (2008).
ICIS consists of an interactive 3D world in which computer networks, along with power, water, and gas
producers and consumers and their interdependencies are modelled as a set of nodes connected by edges. The
nodes represent the producers and consumers (e.g. a node may consume gas and produce electricity) and the
edges represent the flow of a resource (e.g. electricity from a producer node to a light consumer node). The
nodes are visualised as 3D objects, intended to resemble their real-world counterparts, placed in the virtual
world. ICIS has the ability to run on a server, allowing remote client computers to connect to and interact with
the world. Users of these clients can assume a number of roles, including essential services staff and adversaries.

CONCLUSION
Threats to critical infrastructure are not passive. They constantly evolve, and so too must the ability to defend
against such threats. An interactive high-fidelity simulation tool greatly adds to the ability of experts to conduct
multiple risk assessments often without the need to physically deploy, providing a considerable cost saving on
both time and travel.
Leveraging games technology allows simulation scenarios to be rapidly constructed at a very high fidelity and
immediately tested. The networked gaming technology allows remote experts to interact in an intuitive
environment and explore, identify and assess the critical components of the infrastructure. The scenario can be
modified and different configurations can be examined and tested to ascertain the impact of the change on the
risks to the critical infrastructure.
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